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CHRISTOPHER J. WALSH*
Life without parole is an incredibly harsh sentence. Recognizing this fact, the
Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Graham v. Florida held that life without parole
is an unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment for any juvenile convicted of a
nonhomicide crime. This Comment takes the rule from Graham v. Florida and
applies it to another context: sentencing defendants who have been convicted of
drug trafficking in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Under the sentencing scheme of
§ 841(b)(1)(A), a defendant on his third strike—having two prior “felony drug
offense” convictions—must be sentenced to life without parole.
This Comment argues that counting juvenile-age prior convictions as strikes
under § 841(b)(1)(A) to trigger mandatory life without parole is unconstitutional.
Counting juvenile-age prior convictions as strikes effectively results in what
Graham v. Florida forbids: life without parole based on the defendant’s actions as
a juvenile.
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My object all sublime
I shall achieve in time—
To let the punishment fit the crime—
The punishment fit the crime.1
INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution2 represents an
By prohibiting “cruel and unusual
inherently moral judgment.3
punishments,” this constitutional provision embodies a humane ideal of
American society.4 In 2010, the Supreme Court held in Graham v.
Florida5 that juveniles cannot be sentenced to life without parole for
nonhomicide crimes.6 This holding was the first time—outside of the death
penalty context—that the Court categorically declared a particular
sentencing practice “cruel and unusual” because it was disproportionate to
the crime committed and the class of offenders.7 Although the full
implications of this new Eighth Amendment rule are far from clear,8
Graham v. Florida should motivate American society to reassess many
other sentencing practices underlying the criminal justice system.
Sentencing drug traffickers under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) is one such
practice that needs to be reexamined after Graham v. Florida. Part of the
Controlled Substances Act,9 § 841 is one of the federal government’s chief
statutes for prosecuting drug trafficking.10 When a defendant has been
convicted of trafficking certain large quantities of drugs, § 841(b)(1)(A)
governs his sentence.11 Section 841(b)(1)(A) uses a “three strike” scheme

1. W.S. GILBERT, THE MIKADO 68 (MacMillan & Co. 1928) (1885).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
3. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968) (asserting that the Eighth
Amendment encompasses “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,
humanity, and decency”).
4. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing “[t]he
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man”).
5. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
6. Id. at 2030 (interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to mean that
juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses cannot be sentenced to life without parole
because they must be afforded “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release [in the
future] based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation”).
7. See id. at 2022–23 (explaining that this context, “a categorical challenge to a termof-years sentence,” was one “the Court ha[d] not considered previously”).
8. See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (detailing some of the post-Graham v.
Florida legal developments).
9. Pub. L. No. 91–513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C.).
10. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006) (creating a comprehensive statutory structure for
prosecuting and sentencing certain drug trafficking crimes).
11. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A) (governing sentencing for specific amounts of heroin,
cocaine, PCP, methamphetamines, and other controlled substances).
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where any prior “felony drug offense”12 convictions—which do not have to
be prior convictions under this statute—count as strikes to enhance the
defendant’s sentence.13 Under this structure, a defendant is subject to a tenyear mandatory minimum on his first strike, a twenty-year mandatory
minimum on his second strike, and mandatory life without parole on his
third strike.14
In the wake of Graham v. Florida, two federal circuit courts of appeals
decided cases where the defendants challenged their § 841(b)(1)(A) lifewithout-parole sentences.15 In one, United States v. Scott,16 Angelo Scott
had been sentenced to life without parole even though his first two strikes
were drug possession convictions when he was sixteen-years-old and
seventeen-years-old.17 In the other, United States v. Graham,18 Donald
Graham had been sentenced to life without parole even though his first
strike resulted from a guilty plea to drug trafficking charges when he was
seventeen-years-old.19 Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham v.
Florida, both circuits upheld the defendants’ life-without-parole
sentences.20
This Comment argues that counting a defendant’s juvenile-age
convictions as strikes to trigger mandatory life without parole under §
841(b)(1)(A) violates the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. Using juvenile-age convictions under § 841(b)(1)(A)
effectively results in what Graham v. Florida categorically deemed
unconstitutional: life without parole because of the defendant’s actions
when he was under eighteen-years-old. To reach such a conclusion, this
Comment utilizes the Eighth Amendment categorical challenge framework
that the Supreme Court employed in Graham v. Florida.
Still, this Comment argues that juvenile-age convictions need not be
completely ignored at sentencing. Although it is unconstitutional to use
12. See infra note 85 (providing the definition of “felony drug offense” for purposes of
§ 841(b)).
13. See infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text (reviewing § 841(b)(1)(A)’s three
strike system).
14. § 841(b)(1)(A).
15. United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
2962 (2011); United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
964 (2011). At the time these defendants were prosecuted, the minimum amount of crack
cocaine that placed an offender within § 841(b)(1)(A) was fifty grams, an amount which
these defendants were convicted of trafficking. United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d at 448;
United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d at 1011–12. Congress has since raised the amount of crack
cocaine for a defendant to reach § 841(b)(1)(A). See infra note 88 (detailing the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010).
16. 610 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 964 (2011).
17. Id. at 1011–13.
18. 622 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2962 (2011).
19. Id. at 454.
20. Id. at 465; United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d at 1018.
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juvenile-age convictions as strikes under § 841(b)(1)(A), judges should
consider a defendant’s juvenile criminal history under 18 U.S.C. § 3553.
Section 3553(a) is designed to give judges broad discretion in sentencing,
allowing them to consider the defendant as an individual. As such, §
3553(a) is the proper place for juvenile-age convictions to become a factor
in sentencing.
Part I of this Comment briefly overviews the Supreme Court’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause jurisprudence and the Court’s analysis in
Graham v. Florida. Part I also examines § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 3553, and it
explores the four legitimate penological goals of sentencing: retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Last, Part I details the courts’
decisions in United States v. Scott and United States v. Graham.
Part II uses the analytical framework that the Supreme Court employed
in Graham v. Florida to argue that life without parole under § 841(b)(1)(A)
due to juvenile-age strikes is unconstitutional. Part II first argues that
objective indicia show jurisdictions vary tremendously in how they view
this sentencing practice. Part II next asserts that defendants prosecuted
under § 841 with juvenile-age prior convictions are not sufficiently
culpable to deserve life without parole, and no penal theory adequately
justifies life without parole for this class of offenders. Finally, Part II
claims that international norms surrounding juvenile criminal conduct and
drug offenses support the conclusion that this sentencing practice is cruel
and unusual. Part III recommends, however, that judges should still
consider a defendant’s prior juvenile-age convictions at sentencing under §
3553(a).
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”21 The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is the best-known
and most-litigated component of the Eighth Amendment; the Excessive
Bail and Excessive Fines Clauses have proven far less controversial.22
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. For the history of the concept of “cruel and unusual”
punishments in English common law and how the American Framers incorporated that
concept into the Eighth Amendment, see generally Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
22. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327 (1998) (noting that the Supreme
Court “had little occasion to interpret, and ha[d] never actually applied, the Excessive Fines
Clause” prior to that case); id. at 344 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“For the first time in its
history, the Court strikes down a fine as excessive under the Eighth Amendment.”); Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (asserting that a trial court’s
determination in fixing reasonable bail necessitates discretion and thus an “[a]ppellate
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1.

Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause jurisprudence prior to
Graham v. Florida
Through the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Framers
intended to unconditionally prohibit certain methods of inherently barbaric
punishments,23 like torture.24 In view of the “open-ended quality”25 of the
amendment’s text, however, Chief Justice Warren recognized the dynamic
nature of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and declared that this
provision must be interpreted in light of “evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”26 While some members of
the Court have attempted to define a workable set of Eighth Amendment
parameters,27 Justice Murphy’s passage in an unpublished draft of a
dissenting opinion in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber28 illustrates the
difficulty of this task:
More than any other provision in the Constitution, the prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment depends largely, if not entirely, upon the
humanitarian instincts of the judiciary. We have nothing to guide us in
defining what is cruel and unusual apart from our consciences. A
punishment which is considered fair today may be considered cruel
tomorrow. And so we are not dealing here with a set of absolutes. Our
[c]ourt should only reverse for clear abuse of discretion or other mistake of law”).
23. See Granucci, supra note 21, at 860–65 (arguing that the Framers’ intention was to
bar tortuous punishments, but that such a reading was inconsistent with the English
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, which was meant to proscribe excessive
punishments); see also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878) (declaring the
punishments of drawing and quartering, public dissecting, burning alive, and disemboweling
to always be cruel and unusual, regardless of crime).
24. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (establishing that “[p]unishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death”); Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136 (stating “it
is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of
unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden” under the Eighth Amendment).
25. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 13–
14 (1980) (“It is possible to construe [the Eighth Amendment] as covering only those
punishments that would have been regarded as ‘cruel and unusual’ in 1791, but that
construction seems untrue to the open-ended quality of the language.”).
26. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); accord Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (including Trop’s “evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society” language in the majority opinion); see also Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (claiming “[t]he standard of
extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment . . .
[because] [t]he standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the
basic mores of society change”).
27. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), for example, Justice Brennan detailed
“four principles by which we may determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.”
Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to Justice
Brennan, a punishment is cruel and unusual if it is: (1) degrading to human dignity; (2)
arbitrarily inflicted; (3) unanimously rejected by society; or (4) completely unnecessary. Id.
Justice Brennan presumed, however, no state would pass a law that obviously violated any
one of these four principles, so the convergence of these principles would ultimately
determine if a punishment is cruel and unusual. Id. at 282.
28. 329 U.S. 459 (1947). In Resweber, the Court upheld the execution of a black
teenager even though the state’s first attempt at electrocution had failed. Id. at 466.
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decision must necessarily spring from the mosaic of our beliefs, our
backgrounds and the degree of our faith in the dignity of the human
personality.29

In addition to forbidding certain modes of punishment altogether, the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause embodies the principle of
proportionality. In 1910, the Supreme Court in Weems v. United States30
first invalidated a sentence because it was disproportionate to the
underlying crime, reasoning “it is a precept of justice that punishment for
crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”31 The Court has
since explained this principle by asserting that “[e]ven one day in prison
would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a
common cold.”32
More recently, the Supreme Court refined its
proportionality doctrine for term-of-years sentences, asserting that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause contains a “narrow proportionality
principle” that only forbids “grossly disproportionate” sentences rather than
requiring “strict proportionality.”33 Under this narrow proportionality
29. Frank Murphy, Unpublished draft opinion for Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber
(1946) (Box 150, Folder 4, Harold Hitz Burton Papers, Library of Congress), as reprinted
in David J. Danelski, The Riddle of Frank Murphy’s Personality and Jurisprudence, 13
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 189, 196 (1988).
30. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
31. Id. at 367. The Weems Court held a fifteen-year prison sentence, which included
being chained from wrist to ankle and compelled to work “hard and painful labor,” was an
unconstitutional punishment for the crime of falsifying an official public document. Id. at
381–82. Although Weems was the first case in which the Supreme Court struck down a
sentence for being disproportionate, Justice Field had laid the groundwork for this idea
eighteen years earlier. See O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1892) (Field, J.,
dissenting) (arguing the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is directed “against all
punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the
offences charged”).
32. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
invalidated a California statute that made the “status” of narcotics addiction a crime for
which an offender could be prosecuted and jailed for ninety days). Justice Field, in his
O’Neil dissent, also offered analogies, like the one below, to demonstrate why the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause must contain a proportionality component:
The state may, indeed, make the drinking of one drop of liquor an offence to be
punished by imprisonment, but it would be an unheard-of cruelty if it should count
the drops in a single glass, and make thereby a thousand offences, and thus extend
the punishment for drinking the single glass of liquor to an imprisonment of almost
indefinite duration.
O’Neil, 144 U.S. at 340 (Field, J., dissenting).
33. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Kennedy’s
Harmelin opinion also sets the current analytical model by which the Supreme Court
evaluates whether a particular term-of-years sentence is grossly disproportionate to the
underlying crime. First, the Court compares the gravity of the offense and the severity of
the sentence imposed. Id. at 1005. “[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison .
. . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality,” the Court then evaluates the
defendant’s sentence as compared to sentences received by other offenders in the same
jurisdiction and to sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. If these
intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses “validate an initial judgment that [the]
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principle, the Supreme Court has controversially upheld such sentences as
life without parole for possessing 672 grams of cocaine,34 twenty-five years
to life for felony grand theft of three golf clubs,35 and fifty years to life for
shoplifting videotapes.36
Capital punishment has presented the Court with difficulties in its
proportionality doctrine. Despite many persuasive arguments to abolish the
death penalty,37 American society has not outlawed capital punishment.
Still, the Supreme Court has carved out a number of categorical death
penalty rules to define Eighth Amendment proportionality standards
because “death is different.”38 The Court in Atkins v. Virginia,39 for
example, held the mentally-disabled can never be death-eligible.40 Also,
Roper v. Simmons41 declared capital punishment to be completely off-limits
for anyone under the age of eighteen.42 Further, Kennedy v. Louisiana43
established the bright line that the death penalty is unconstitutional for all
nonhomicide crimes against individual persons.44 In these categorical
death penalty cases, the Supreme Court used a two-step analytical
framework that differed from its term-of-years narrow proportionality
approach.45
sentence is grossly disproportionate,” the sentence is unconstitutional. Id.
34. Id. at 961, 996 (majority opinion). Interestingly, just one year later, the state statute
at issue in Harmelin was invalidated by the Michigan Supreme Court under the state’s
constitution. See People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 870–74 (Mich. 1992) (holding the
state constitution’s ban on “cruel or unusual” punishments reached broader than the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual” punishments).
35. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 17–18, 30–31 (2003).
36. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66, 77 (2003).
37. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 78–81 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment) (outlining a number of arguments that undermine the three prominent
justifications—incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution—advanced in favor of capital
punishment).
38. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (opinion of Marshall, J.); accord
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (“When the law punishes by death, it risks
its own sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the constitutional commitment to
decency and restraint.”).
39. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
40. Id. at 314–16, 321 (overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
41. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
42. Id. at 574 (holding eighteen is “the age at which the line for death eligibility ought
to rest” since society frequently uses that age to distinguish youth from adulthood). In
coming to this conclusion, the Roper Court relied on three general differences between
juveniles and adults: (1) juveniles are less mature and responsible, characteristics which
produce “impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions”; (2) juveniles are more
susceptible to “negative influences and outside pressures”; and (3) a juvenile’s character is
not as well developed as that of an adult. Id. at 569–70.
43. 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
44. Id. at 438 (holding that the defendant, a child rapist, could not be sentenced to
death).
45. In the categorical rule context, the Court first considered “objective indicia of
society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice,” to see if a
national consensus existed either for or against the challenged sentence. Roper, 543 U.S. at
563. If a consensus were found, it was “entitled to great weight,” Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 434,
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2.

Graham v. Florida: The Supreme Court’s new categorical
proportionality rule
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Graham v. Florida46
and Sullivan v. Florida,47 many commentators believed the Court would
issue two major Eighth Amendment opinions about sentencing juveniles.48
In the end, however, the Court’s new rule announced in Graham v. Florida
mooted Sullivan.49
Terrence Graham was sixteen-years-old when he was charged with
attempted armed robbery, pleaded guilty, and was thus sentenced to three
years probation.50 Soon after Graham was out of jail, though, police again
arrested him in connection with another series of armed robberies.51
Because Graham had violated the terms of his probation, he was subject to
a minimum sentence of five years and a maximum sentence of life in
prison.52 The state recommended that Graham, still a juvenile, should
receive thirty years imprisonment.53 The trial judge sentenced him to the
statutory maximum of life without parole.54 Florida’s intermediate
appellate court affirmed Graham’s sentence,55 and the Florida Supreme
Court denied review.56 Upon Graham’s petition, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.57
Justice Kennedy wrote for a five-member majority in Graham v.

but such consensus was never determinative of Eighth Amendment standards by itself.
Instead, the Court then “determine[d], in the exercise of [its] own independent judgment,
whether the [sentence was] disproportionate punishment.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. At this
second stage of the analysis, the Court turned to “standards elaborated by controlling
precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose.” Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421. Lastly, the
Court often considered standards set by the international community to be persuasive. E.g.,
Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (looking to various international sources as “instructive” in
interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
46. 129 S. Ct. 2157, 2157 (2009) (granting certiorari).
47. 129 S. Ct. 2157, 2157 (2009) (granting certiorari). In Sullivan, the defendant
challenged the life-without-parole sentence he received as a thirteen-year-old. Brief for
Petitioner at 2–5, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (per curiam) (No. 08-7621).
48. E.g., Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Why Two Juvenile Sentence Cases?, SCOTUSBLOG
(May 4, 2009, 5:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=9424 (observing that the Supreme
Court “set[] the stage for two rulings, perhaps with different potential outcomes,” when it
took both Graham v. Florida and Sullivan).
49. See Sullivan, 130 S. Ct. at 2059 (dismissing the writ of certiorari as having been
improvidently granted).
50. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010).
51. Id. at 2018–19.
52. Id. at 2019.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2019–20. Because Florida did not have a parole system available for Graham,
his life sentence was effectively life without parole. Id. at 2020.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Graham v. Florida, 129 S. Ct. 2157, 2157 (2009).
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Florida.58 Since Graham’s case presented “a categorical challenge to a
term-of-years sentence,” the majority employed the two-step analytical
approach used in Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy.59
Under this framework, the Court first examined the “objective indicia”
of how various jurisdictions viewed the sentencing practice at issue.60
Objective indicia include both legislative enactments and how frequently
the sentence is actually imposed.61 At this first step, the Court found a
national consensus against life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide
offenders.62 Even though many jurisdictions allowed such sentences by
statute, few imposed them in practice.63 This national consensus was thus
“entitled to great weight,” but it was not dispositive; the Court needed to
proceed to the second analytical step.64
At the second step, the Court considered a number of factors in
exercising its “independent judgment.”65 To start, the Court evaluated “the
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and
characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question.”66
On this point, the Court asserted that juvenile nonhomicide offenders have
diminished culpability and thus do not deserve life without parole.67 Next,
the analysis turned to whether the sentence served the penological goals of
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.68 The Court
concluded that none of these four goals supported life without parole for
juveniles who did not commit homicide because of the unique
characteristics of this class of offenders.69
The Court’s own reasoning, therefore, confirmed the national consensus
58. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor fully joined Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion in Graham v. Florida. 130 S. Ct. at 2017. Chief Justice Roberts, although
agreeing with the majority that Graham’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment,
concurred separately because he would have relied solely on the Court’s narrow
proportionality methodology and the reasoning of Roper to come to this conclusion. See id.
at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment) (believing there was “no need to invent a
new constitutional rule of dubious provenance”).
59. Id. at 2022–23 (majority opinion) (emphasis added); see also id. at 2046 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“For the first time in its history, the Court declares an entire class of
offenders immune from a noncapital sentence using the categorical approach it previously
reserved for death penalty cases alone.”).
60. Id. at 2023 (majority opinion).
61. Id. (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)).
62. Id. at 2023–26 (concluding that this sentencing practice was “exceedingly rare”).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2026 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2026–28.
68. Id. at 2026, 2028 (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality
opinion)).
69. Id. at 2028–30 (discussing juveniles’ lack of maturity, ability to change, and other
similar traits).
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that this sentencing practice was cruel and unusual.70 As a result, the Court
declared that juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses cannot receive
life without parole, for they must be given “some meaningful opportunity
to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”71 The
majority elaborated, “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the
possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before
adulthood will remain behind bars for life,” but this amendment “does
forbid States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders
never will be fit to reenter society.”72 Last, the Court verified its
conclusion by turning to international standards, which confirmed that this
sentencing practice had been “rejected the world over.”73
Dissenting, Justice Thomas opined that Graham’s life-without-parole
sentence would not have been cruel and unusual at the time of the
Founding and that the judgments of modern legislatures, judges, and juries
on this question showed that society had not evolved to thinking the
practice was cruel and unusual.74 In a concurring opinion,75 Justice Stevens
responded to Justice Thomas’ view of the Eighth Amendment as too
“rigid” and asserted: “Society changes. Knowledge accumulates. We
learn, sometimes, from our mistakes.”76 To Justice Stevens, “[s]tandards of
decency . . . will never stop [evolving].”77
Most legal developments after Graham v. Florida have focused on the
practicalities of how to implement this new rule, especially in jurisdictions,
like Florida, that had previously abolished their parole systems.78 In
70. Id. at 2030.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2033–34.
74. Id. at 2044–53 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’
dissent in full, and Justice Alito joined in part because he did not believe the record
warranted addressing some of the issues that Justice Thomas argued. See id. at 2058–59
(Alito, J., dissenting) (maintaining that since Graham had abandoned his as-applied
challenge under the Court’s narrow proportionality framework, he would not reach that
issue which was not properly preserved).
75. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined Justice Stevens’ concurrence as well as the
opinion of the Court. Id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. Id. Justice Stevens’ language cannot help but remind a reader of Justice Holmes’
famous passage declaring:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience . . . . The substance
of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what
is then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the degree to
which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much upon its past.
O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1–2 (1881).
77. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78. E.g., David Ovalle, Ruling on Young, Violent Lifers Puts Florida Justice on the
Spot, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 26, 2010, (on file with Law Review),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/09/25/v-fullstory/1842695/ruling-on-young-violentlifers.html (discussing two possible solutions for how Florida could comply with Graham v.
Florida’s mandate, with both solutions calling for long-term prison sentences with the
possibility of parole).
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addition, state courts continue to assert that Graham v. Florida should not
be further expanded, holding that juveniles who do commit homicide may
be subject to life without parole.79 While Graham v. Florida’s holding
reached broadly, many questions regarding the expansiveness of its
analysis remain.
B. Sentencing Drug Traffickers in the Federal System
In response to the escalating problems of illegal drug use during the
1960’s,80 Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) as part of
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.81
Within the CSA, one of the federal government’s main statutes for
prosecuting drug traffickers is 21 U.S.C. § 841.82 This statute’s first
subsection, § 841(a), makes it a federal crime to “knowingly or
intentionally . . . manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.”83
The statute’s next subsection, § 841(b), creates the sentencing scheme
for defendants convicted under § 841(a).84 A defendant’s sentence under §
841(b) is largely based on two factors: (1) the quantity of drugs he was
trafficking and (2) the number of prior “felony drug offense”85 convictions
79. See, e.g., Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, 53–54 (2011) (holding life without
parole for a juvenile convicted of homicide does not violate the Eighth Amendment); State
v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 376–78 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
3070 (2011); State v. Golka, 796 N.W.2d 198, 215–16 (Neb. 2011) (same).
80. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, pt. 1, at 6 (1970) (emphasizing the 322% increase in the
number of drug-related arrests in 1968 compared to those made in 1960); see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 801(2) (2006) (noting the substantial negative impact of unlawful drug activity on the
American public’s health and general welfare).
81. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
82. While § 841(a) criminalizes the actual commission of drug trafficking, federal
prosecutors also regularly use this statute’s conspiracy analog, 21 U.S.C. § 846, to go after
drug traffickers. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 199, 205–07 (1993) (detailing prosecutorial strategy in charging drug
traffickers); cf. David Marusarz, Note, Never Hanging Defendants Out to Dry: Preserving
the Policy Behind the Statute of Limitations in Money Laundering Conspiracies, 45 VAL. U.
L. REV. 253, 266 & n.59 (2010) (citing J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR
CRIME 31 (2d ed. 2006)) (explaining why prosecutors also frequently bring conspiracy
charges in white collar crime prosecutions). When a defendant is convicted for conspiracy
to traffic controlled substances under § 846, he is subject to the sentencing scheme of §
841(b). See § 846 (“Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined
in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense,
the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.”).
83. Id. § 841(a). “Controlled substance” is a term of art for purposes of this law and is
defined in § 802. Id. § 802(6).
84. Id. § 841(b).
85. The term “felony drug offense” is defined as “an offense that is punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or
foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana,
anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances.” Id. § 802(44). In a case with §
841(b)(1)(A) specifically at issue, the Supreme Court held the term “felony drug offense” is
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on his record.86 Regarding the first factor, § 841(b) creates different tiers
of mandatory minimum sentences based on the quantity of drugs at issue.87
Of the various tiers, § 841(b)(1)(A) governs the highest quantities of
drugs.88
Once a defendant qualifies for sentencing under § 841(b)(1)(A), the
second factor—his number of prior “felony drug offense” convictions—
becomes relevant.89 Congress utilized this “strike” system in § 841(b)
primarily to deter recidivism and incapacitate repeat-offenders.90 A prior
conviction under any number of federal and state drug laws, not just §
841(a), can qualify as a “felony drug offense” for purposes of this
subsection.91 Under § 841(b)(1)(A), a defendant who has no prior “felony
drug offense” convictions is subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum
sentence.92 A defendant with one prior “felony drug offense” conviction is
subject to a twenty-year mandatory minimum.93 And a defendant within §
841(b)(1)(A) on his third strike—meaning he has “two or more prior
convictions for a felony drug offense”—must be sentenced to a “mandatory

defined exclusively by § 802(44) and does not incorporate the definition of “felony” found
in § 802(13). See Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 130 (2008) (ruling “felony drug
offense” to be a term of art under the CSA); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942
(2000) (stating that courts must follow an explicit definition when included in a statute).
86. See § 841(b) (setting unlawful quantities for various controlled substances and
using increased penalties based on prior convictions).
87. Id.
88. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A) (covering such drug quantities as “1 kilogram or more of a
mixture of substance containing a detectable amount of heroin,” “50 grams or more of a
mixture or substance . . . which contains cocaine base,” “100 grams or more of
phencyclidine (PCP),” “50 grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts
of its isomers,” and others). In the summer of 2010, Congress raised the § 841(b)(1)(A)
floor to 280 grams of crack cocaine. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220,
§ 2(a)(1), 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii)) (increasing
the minimum threshold of crack cocaine to 280 grams partly to alleviate the perceived racial
bias between crack cocaine and powder cocaine quantities).
89. § 841(b)(1)(A).
90. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, pt. 1, at 10 (1970) (intending the escalating mandatory
minimum sentencing scheme “to serve as a strong deterrent to those who otherwise might
wish to engage in the illicit traffic, while also providing a means for keeping those found
guilty of violations out of circulation”). The second-highest tier of sentences, §
841(b)(1)(B), covers lesser quantities of controlled substances and also uses a strike system.
§ 841(b)(1)(B). A defendant falling within § 841(b)(1)(B) who does not have a prior
“felony drug offense” conviction is subject to a five-year mandatory minimum sentence and
a maximum sentence of forty years. Id. A defendant subject to § 841(b)(1)(B) with “a prior
conviction for a felony drug offense,” however, must receive a mandatory minimum of ten
years and faces a maximum term of life without parole. Id. Thus, this Comment’s
arguments about the unconstitutionality of sentencing a defendant to life without parole
based on juvenile-age prior convictions could also apply to § 841(b)(1)(B), but this
Comment focuses on § 841(b)(1)(A) because § 841(b)(1)(A) mandates a life without parole
sentence on the defendant’s third strike and because judges rarely impose a maximum
sentence available by statute.
91. See supra note 85 (providing the expansive definition of “felony drug offense”).
92. § 841(b)(1)(A).
93. Id.
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term of life imprisonment without release.”94
For example, a defendant convicted of trafficking sixty grams of
methamphetamine falls into § 841(b)(1)(A).95 If the defendant does not
have a prior “felony drug offense” conviction on his record, he faces a
minimum sentence of ten years in prison.96 If the defendant is on his
second strike because he was previously convicted of possessing crack
cocaine, he is subject to a sentence of at least twenty years.97 And if that
defendant is on his third strike, having been convicted of possessing crack
cocaine on two prior occasions, he must be sentenced to life without
parole.98
In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 addresses the “imposition of a sentence”
generally, and this statute overlays all criminal sentencing in the federal
system, including sentencing under § 841(b).99 The basic command of §
3553(a) is that a defendant should receive “a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary” to comply with certain sentencing goals in the
particular case.100 Section 3553(a) delineates a host of factors for federal
judges to consider when sentencing a defendant, including: the nature and
circumstances of the offense,101 the defendant’s history and
characteristics,102 the deterrent value of the sentence,103 the need to provide
the defendant with educational or vocational training,104 the types of
sentences available,105 any recommended sentencing range in the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines,106 the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities among like defendants,107 and the need to provide restitution to
any victims.108 As such, § 3553(a) grants judges broad discretion to
sentence the defendant as an individual, based on the specific facts of the
case.109
94. Id.
95. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (covering “50 grams or more of methamphetamine, its
salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers”).
96. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
100. Id. § 3553(a). See generally George L. Blum, Annotation, Construction and
Application of “Parsimony Clause” of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a), Providing that District Court
Shall Impose Sentence Sufficient, but Not Greater Than Necessary, to Comply with §
3553(a)(2), 38 A.L.R. FED. 2D 147, 147–200 (2009) (outlining how courts have treated this
“parsimony clause”).
101. § 3553(a)(1).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
104. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
105. Id. § 3553(a)(3).
106. Id. § 3553(a)(4).
107. Id. § 3553(a)(6).
108. Id. § 3553(a)(7).
109. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (promoting a theory of
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C. The Penological Goals of Sentencing
The Supreme Court has only explicitly recognized four penological goals
as legitimate: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.110
Of these four, legislatures have flexibility in choosing why to punish
criminals, for “the Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of any
one penological theory.”111
1.

Retribution
The penological goal of retribution aims to punish the defendant as
repayment for his past crime.112 Retribution has been termed “the oldest
theory of punishment,”113 for human impulses seem to naturally desire that
an individual who commits a prohibited act should be punished.114 As
Justice Marshall noted, however, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause serves as “insulation from our baser selves” since it “limits the
avenues through which vengeance can be channeled.”115 Thus, modern
retributivists usually justify punishment because “it tends to ‘restore an
order of fairness which was disrupted by the criminal’s criminal act.’”116
Supporters of the retributive penal theory can be generally divided into
two camps: harm-based retributivists and intent-based retributivists.117
Harm-based retributivists focus on the external consequences of crime,

individualized sentencing for every defendant convicted of a crime).
110. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (citing Ewing v. California, 538
U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion)).
111. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment); accord Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (acknowledging
the legislature’s discretion to identify the goals of criminal punishment).
112. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1431 (9th ed. 2009) (defining retribution as
“[p]unishment imposed as repayment or revenge for the offense committed; requital”).
Immanuel Kant’s work laid the basis for the retributivist theory of punishment. See
generally IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (John Ladd trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1999) (1797)
(rationalizing that punishment is only legitimate when a person deserves it because of his
past wrongdoing).
113. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(a)(6), at 29 (4th ed. 2003).
114. Jeremy Bentham, a pioneer in the Anglo-American philosophy of law who is bestknown for setting the modern foundation of utilitarianism, observed that “[t]he great merit
of the law of retaliation is its simplicity,” for “[n]o other imaginable plan can for its extent
find so easy an entrance into the apprehension, or sit so easy on the memory.” JEREMY
BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 93 (James T. McHugh ed., Prometheus Books
2009) (1775). At the same time, however, Bentham recognized the “variety of objections”
to purely retributive punishment, so he asserted that only offenses against the person can
justify retribution as a rationale for punishment. Id. at 93–94.
115. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 345 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(elaborating that “[w]ere this not so, the [Eighth Amendment’s] language would be empty
and a return to the rack and other tortures would be possible in a given case”).
116. Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm Under the
Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 735 (1988) (quoting JOHN M. FINNIS,
FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 128 (1983)).
117. Id. at 735–36.
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believing punishment is justified by, and measured in relation to, “the
culpable causing of a prohibited harm.”118 Intent-based retributivists, on
the other hand, emphasize “what [the defendant] was trying to do, intended
to do and believed he was doing, rather than upon the actual consequences
of his conduct.”119 The Supreme Court has generally favored an intentbased retributivist model,120 demonstrated by Justice O’Connor’s oftencited language in Tison v. Arizona121: “The heart of the retribution
rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal offender.”122
2.

Deterrence
While the Supreme Court has sanctioned the theory of deterrence
generally,123 this overarching penological goal actually breaks down into
two concepts: general deterrence and specific deterrence.124 General
deterrence is the notion that punishing a criminal for his illegal conduct
will stop others from committing future crimes because they will fear being
punished in a similar manner.125 As Justice Holmes explained this idea,
“[p]ublic policy sacrifices the individual to the general good.”126 General
deterrence, thus, is an outward-focused doctrine.127 This penological
theory has had many supporters—most notably Jeremy Bentham, who

118. Id. at 735.
119. Id. at 736.
120. See Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 81, 106–07 (2010)
(claiming that the Supreme Court took an uncharacteristic approach with its “harm-based
retributivist turn” in Kennedy v. Louisiana).
121. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
122. Id. at 149, 158 (reasoning that capital punishment is not cruel and unusual for a
felony-murder conviction when the defendant was significantly involved in committing the
felony and exhibited “reckless indifference to human life”); accord id. at 180–81 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (noting that retribution can only be a constitutionally valid basis for
punishment when it involves the criminal justice system channeling the public’s instinct of
an “eye for an eye”).
123. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (including deterrence as one of the four
legitimate penological theories).
124. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.03, at 15 (5th ed. 2009)
(distinguishing general from specific deterrence).
125. See LAFAVE, supra note 113, § 1.5(a)(4), at 28–29 (summarizing the concept of
deterrence and the major scholarship surrounding this doctrine); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING,
PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 3 (1971) (describing general deterrence as effective because
“threats can reduce crime by causing a change of heart, induced by the unpleasantness of the
specific consequences threatened”).
126. HOLMES, supra note 76, at 48.
127. See PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 53–54 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds.,
1992) (“General deterrence seeks to further the aim of crime prevention by setting it so as to
induce other citizens who might be tempted to commit crime to desist out of fear of the
penalty.” (emphasis added)); Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law
Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 259–60 (1972) (noting that the idea of using law
enforcement to deter people, other than the person apprehended, has always been a basic
component of crime control).
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argued that general deterrence “ought to be the chief end of punishment.”128
Specific deterrence, by contrast, focuses on reducing the threat of future
crime from a particular defendant.129 According to this penological model,
punishment is warranted to deter the criminal “by giving him an unpleasant
experience he will not want to endure again.”130 The idea is that a criminal
will learn his lesson while incarcerated and, therefore, will steer clear of
future crime upon reentering society.131
3.

Incapacitation
Like specific deterrence, incapacitation focuses on the individual
offender.132 Under this theory, imprisonment (and sometimes capital
punishment) is justified because it removes the offender from society so
that he cannot commit more crimes.133 As Professor Packer explained,
incapacitation is “[t]he simplest justification for any punishment that
involves the use of physical restraint [because,] for its duration[,] the
person on whom it is being inflicted loses entirely or nearly so the capacity
to commit further crimes.”134 At its base, then, the penological theory of
incapacitation relies on the criminal justice system’s ability to predict who
is likely to commit future crimes.135
In recent decades, the United States has increasingly turned to the
strategy of incapacitation.136 The United States currently has the highest
128. BENTHAM, supra note 114, at 62. Bentham explained the rationale of general
deterrence as follows:
If we could consider an offence which has been committed as an isolated fact, the
like of which would never recur, punishment would be useless. It would be only
adding one evil to another. But when we consider that an unpunished crime leaves
the path of crime open not only to the same delinquent, but also to all those who
may have the same motives and opportunities for entering upon it, we perceive that
the punishment inflicted on the individual becomes a source of security to all.
Id.
129. See PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 127, at 53 (stating that individual
deterrence aims to establish a punishment that is sufficient to prevent the offender from
reoffending).
130. LAFAVE, supra note 113, § 1.5(a)(1), at 26–27.
131. See DRESSLER, supra note 124, § 2.03, at 15 (explaining specific deterrence as
“intimidation” because the defendant’s “punishment reminds him that if he returns to a life
of crime, he will experience more pain”).
132. As Professor Ryan noted, scholars often link the theories of incapacitation and
specific deterrence because specific deterrence, in its broadest form, can be thought of as
encompassing incapacitation. See Ryan, supra note 120, at 109 n.153 (providing sources
that tie the concepts of incapacitation and specific deterrence).
133. Id. at 109–10. But see id. at 110 n.154 (noting the reality that a “prisoner does have
the opportunity to commit future crimes in prison”).
134. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 48 (1968).
135. See id. at 49 (suggesting that the theory of incapacitation bases its assessment of an
individual’s personality on the particular crime he committed and then predicts that he will
commit similar crimes in the future).
136. See THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 3
(2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_
Prison08_FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf (describing how the United States prison population
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incarceration rate in the world,137 and in 2008, for the first time in the
nation’s history, more than one in every 100 American adults was
incarcerated.138 According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), the United
States had 1,613,740 prisoners in federal and state custody by the end of
2009.139 The DOJ’s statistics also detail larger incarceration trends. From
2000–2009, for example, the United States’ total prison population grew by
222,479 inmates, a 6.2% increase.140 Also, more broadly, the federal
imprisonment rate rose from 21 per 100,000 U.S. residents in 1990 to 61
per 100,000 U.S. residents in 2009.141
4.

Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation is “[t]he process of seeking to improve a criminal’s
character and outlook so that he or she can function in society without
committing other crimes.”142 The goal of rehabilitation looks at the present
and future.143 The “rehabilitative ideal” has long been a part of the
American criminal justice system, emerging alongside the first United
States penitentiaries in the early 1800’s.144 In fact, rehabilitation was the
preferred penological theory in the United States for much of the twentieth
has increased over the past three decades).
137. See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions:
Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 472 & n.60 (2010) (noting
how the United States is the country with the world’s highest incarceration rate and the
extensive media coverage this fact has received).
138. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 136, at 3 (providing statistics and
asserting that growing prison populations in recent years have “saddl[ed] cash-strapped
states with soaring costs they can ill afford [while] failing to have a clear impact either on
recidivism or overall crime”).
139. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2009, at 1 (2009) [hereinafter DOJ 2009
PRISON REPORT], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf. In addition
to these inmates in the federal and state systems, several hundred thousand prisoners are
also in local jails every year. See THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 136, at 5
(pointing out the number of inmates in local jails during 2008).
140. DOJ 2009 PRISON REPORT, supra note 139, at 2 tbl.1.
141. Id. at 3 fig.3.
142. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1398–99 (9th ed. 2009).
143. Professor Morris’ description of therapy illustrates the nature of this penological
goal:
Therapy is not a response to a person who is at fault. We respond to an individual,
not because of what he has done, but because of some condition from which he is
suffering. If he is no longer suffering from the condition, treatment no longer has a
point. Punishment, then, focuses on the past; therapy, on the present. Therapy is
normally associated with compassion for what one undergoes, not resentment for
what one has illegitimately done.
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968), as reprinted in
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 127, at 18.
144. Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy,
Practice, and Prospects, 3 CRIM. JUST. 2000 111, 114 (2000) (citing GUSTAVE DE
BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE (S. Ill. Univ. Press 1964) (1833); DAVID J.
ROTHMAN, DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC (1971)).
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century.145 As the Supreme Court noted, the justification for rehabilitation
was rooted in “a view that it was realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the
inmate and thereby to minimize the risk that he would resume criminal
activity upon his return to society.”146
Starting in the 1970’s, however, many scholars began to question the
plausibility of rehabilitation.147 In 1974, sociologist Robert Martinson
famously summarized his findings after studying the effectiveness of
rehabilitation by declaring, “[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the
rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable
effect on recidivism.”148 From the 1970’s until today, the American
criminal justice system—to the delight of some and to the dismay of
others149—has significantly turned away from rehabilitation as a primary
goal.150 Nonetheless, rehabilitation remains a penological theory that the
Supreme Court allows legislatures to endorse.151
D. Two post-Graham v. Florida Circuit Court Decisions on
§ 841(b)(1)(A) Life-Without-Parole Sentences
1.

United States v. Scott
Angelo Scott and his two co-conspirators were crack cocaine dealers in
Iowa City, Iowa.152 After the police uncovered their operation and arrested
them, federal prosecutors charged Scott with conspiracy to distribute an
excess of fifty grams of crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C § 846.153 The jury
convicted Scott on this charge, subjecting him to the penalty scheme of §
841(b)(1)(A).154 At sentencing, the district court found that Scott had two
145. See id. at 116–18 (describing the evolution of the “rehabilitative ideal” and its
popularity during the early-twentieth century).
146. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
147. See Cullen & Gendreau, supra note 144, at 119–24 (summarizing the scholarship
which reviewed the practice of rehabilitation and concluded that rehabilitative efforts had
been largely ineffective to that point).
148. Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INTEREST 22, 25 (1974) (italics in original omitted), available at NAT’L AFFAIRS,
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/what-worksquestions-and-answersabout-prison-reform.
149. Compare FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL
POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981), as reprinted in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note
127, at 23–30 (detailing the primary modern criticisms of the goal of rehabilitation), with
FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION (1982), as
reprinted in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 127, at 31–32 (advocating for a return to
more expansive rehabilitative efforts).
150. Cullen & Gendreau, supra note 144, at 119–24.
151. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (including rehabilitation as one of the
four penological goals which the Supreme Court regards as legitimate).
152. United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1011–12 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 964 (2011).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1012.
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prior felony drug offense convictions, triggering a mandatory life-withoutparole sentence.155 Significantly, Scott’s first strike was the result of a
conviction for possessing heroin when he was sixteen-years-old,156 and his
second strike came at age seventeen when he was convicted for possessing
Scott appealed on three issues, including the
crack cocaine.157
constitutionality of his sentence under the Eighth Amendment.158
Two months after the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed Scott’s conviction and sentence.159 With respect to
the Eighth Amendment issue, the court held Scott’s sentence was not cruel
and unusual even though his first two strikes were the result of his actions
as a juvenile.160 The Eighth Circuit noted that Scott had been charged,
tried, and convicted as an adult for both of his predicate offenses.161 Even
if Scott had been convicted as a juvenile, the court explained it would
nonetheless permit “the use of juvenile court adjudications to enhance
subsequent sentences for adult convictions.”162
The Eighth Circuit asserted Graham v. Florida did not affect this
outcome because Scott was twenty-five-years-old when police arrested him
for the conspiracy charge that was his third strike.163 According to the
court, Graham v. Florida was only applicable to “defendants sentenced to
life in prison without parole for crimes committed as juveniles.”164 The
Eighth Circuit did not believe Graham v. Florida implicated the
constitutionality of using prior juvenile convictions to enhance a convicted
adult’s sentence.165
155. Id. (clarifying that “[w]hile the prior convictions were under aliases, the district
court found that the Government proved that the person convicted of each crime was
actually Scott”).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1013.
159. Id. at 1018.
160. Id. The Eighth Circuit also rejected Scott’s other Eighth Amendment argument—
that his life-without-parole sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime he
committed—based on existing circuit precedent. See id. at 1017–18 (citing United States v.
Williams, 534 F.3d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Whiting, 528 F.3d 595, 597
(8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); United States v. Whitehead, 487 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 (8th Cir.
2007); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 679–80 (8th Cir. 2003)).
161. Id. at 1018.
162. Id. (citing United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032–33 (8th Cir. 2002)).
163. Id. Likewise, the Eighth Circuit dismissed Scott’s argument based on Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), characterizing Roper as reaching no further than
“address[ing] the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty for a murder committed by
a juvenile.” United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d at 1018.
164. Id.
165. Id.; accord United States v. Cole-Jackson, No. 10-6156, 2011 WL 310518, at *3
(10th Cir. Feb. 2, 2011) (announcing that “this court has no doubt it is proper under the
Eighth Amendment to consider adult criminal convictions, even though the defendant was
under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime, in arriving at an
appropriate sentence for a recidivist offender who continues to commit crimes into
adulthood”).
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2.

United States v. Graham
Donald Graham was also a crack cocaine dealer.166 Police arrested
Graham as part of a drug investigation in northern Kentucky, and federal
prosecutors charged him with a multiple-count indictment for crack cocaine
offenses.167 After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Graham of, among
other things, conspiracy to distribute an excess of fifty grams of crack
cocaine.168 At sentencing, the district court found Graham was on his third
strike, having two prior felony drug offense convictions.169 Graham’s first
strike was the result of a guilty plea to aggravated drug trafficking when he
was seventeen-years-old, and his second strike was for a cocaine trafficking
conviction when he was nineteen-years-old.170 Consequently, the district
court sentenced Graham to the mandatory term of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole under § 841(b)(1)(A).171 Graham then
appealed his sentence.172
In United States v. Graham, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Donald Graham’s
sentence four months after the Supreme Court ruled in Graham v.
Florida.173 With regard to his Eighth Amendment challenge, the Sixth
Circuit stressed that Graham was convicted and sentenced as an adult for
his first predicate offense even though he was younger than eighteen-yearsold at that time.174 Unlike the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Scott,
though, the Sixth Circuit “decline[d] to express any opinion on whether a
juvenile-delinquency adjudication should qualify as a ‘felony drug offense’
for § 841(b)(1)(A) mandatory-minimum purposes.”175 Nevertheless, like
the Eighth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit did not believe Graham v. Florida
governed because the defendant received mandatory life without parole for
a conviction when he was an adult.176 Thus, the court held Graham’s
sentence was not cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.177
Judge Merritt dissented in United States v. Graham.178 In addition to a
variety of statutory arguments, Judge Merritt briefly discussed the

166. United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 447 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
2962 (2011).
167. Id. at 447–48.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 454.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 448.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 465.
174. Id. at 454–64.
175. Id. at 460.
176. Id. at 462.
177. Id. at 463–64.
178. Id. at 465–70 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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implications of the recent Graham v. Florida decision.179 He contended
that “sentencing this nonviolent, 30-year-old petty drug trafficker to life
imprisonment by using a juvenile conviction as a necessary third strike . . .
violate[d] the sound principles of penological policy based on the Eighth
Amendment values recently outlined by the Supreme Court in Graham v.
Florida.”180 Although he recognized that the holding in Graham v. Florida
was “technically speaking, probably not binding,”181 Judge Merritt opined
that Graham v. Florida “should at least make our court and the court
system more sensitive to the important distinction between juvenile and
adult criminal conduct.”182
II. LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE UNDER § 841(b)(1)(A) DUE TO JUVENILE-AGE
STRIKES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BASED ON GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
Based on the analytical framework of Graham v. Florida, using juvenileage prior convictions to trigger life without parole under § 841(b)(1)(A)
violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Graham v. Florida’s
first step, examining the objective indicia of how society views this
sentencing practice, demonstrates the lack of a national consensus on this
issue.183 This sentencing practice is unconstitutional, however, based on
Graham v. Florida’s second step. Defendants who are sentenced to life
without parole under § 841(b)(1)(A) due to juvenile-age strikes are not
sufficiently culpable to deserve this sentence, the second-harshest
punishment in the American criminal justice system.184 Moreover, no
legitimate penological goal adequately justifies life without parole for these
defendants.185 Finally, as in Graham v. Florida, international norms
regarding juvenile criminal conduct and drug offenses support the
conclusion that § 841(b)(1)(A) life without parole for defendants with
juvenile-age strikes is cruel and unusual.186
As a result, Angelo Scott should have been subject to a ten-year
mandatory minimum because his two prior “felony drug offense”
convictions occurred when he was under eighteen-years-old.187 Likewise,
Donald Graham should have been subject to a twenty-year mandatory

179. Id. at 465.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 470.
182. Id. at 469.
183. Infra Part II.A.
184. Infra Part II.B.1.
185. Infra Part II.B.2.
186. Infra Part II.C.
187. United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
964 (2011).
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minimum because his first prior “felony drug offense” conviction occurred
when he was a juvenile.188
A. Objective Indicia Show the United States Lacks a Clear Societal
Consensus Regarding this Sentencing Practice
Examining the objective indicia of how American society views this
sentencing practice, as Graham v. Florida did,189 reveals the absence of a
national consensus because the nation’s jurisdictions vary widely in how
they treat criminal defendants under eighteen-years-old. Atkins insisted
that “the clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”190 Yet it is
nearly impossible to simply examine legislation for a definitive conclusion
in this instance. For example, sometimes the defendant’s age automatically
determines whether an adult criminal court or the juvenile adjudicatory
system will process him.191 Other times, however, prosecutors have
discretion concerning how to charge a defendant.192
Also, some
jurisdictions only allow juvenile-age defendants to be charged in the adult
system when they have committed certain enumerated crimes.193 These
differences illustrate the complexity inherent in attempting to find a
national consensus regarding this sentencing practice.194
Though an imperfect analogy, the manner in which jurisdictions treat
adult defendants with criminal histories in the juvenile system can be
informative. Currently, almost every American jurisdiction has at least one
188. United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
2962 (2011).
189. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (detailing Graham v. Florida’s first
step of analysis).
190. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
191. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2307 (2011) (mandating that the defendant be at least
fifteen-years-old to be prosecuted in the adult criminal system, with one exception of no
minimum age requirement for the crime of possessing a firearm within one-thousand feet of
a school or day care center); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.110 (2011) (allowing juveniles to be
prosecuted in adult court only if they are at least sixteen-years-old).
192. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 985.557(1)–(2) (2010) (providing a detailed, complicated set
of criteria for either discretionary or mandatory filing of an information); Paul Duggan,
Juvenile Charged in D.C. Shootings Can’t be Tried as Adult, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2010,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/crime-scene/paul-duggan/juvenile-charged-in-dcshootin.html (noting how the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Washington, D.C. “has the
discretion to prosecute a 16- or 17-year-old suspect as an adult if the youth is charged with
murder, armed robbery, rape, or first-degree burglary”).
193. See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 37-1-134 (2010) (permitting defendants under
sixteen-years-old to be prosecuted in adult criminal court if charged with “first degree
murder, second degree murder, rape, aggravated rape, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a
child, aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, kidnapping, aggravated
kidnapping or especially aggravated kidnapping or an attempt to commit any such
offenses”).
194. See also Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1940, 1953–54 (2010) (discussing further variables that complicate this issue).
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juvenile court statute allowing juvenile records to be used at sentencing in
adult criminal court.195 In addition, many jurisdictions have various
criminal court provisions, such as sentencing statutes, guidelines, and
presentence reports, which authorize the use of juvenile records at
sentencing.196
Even though this plethora of statutory provisions demonstrates that
American society favors enhanced sentences because of prior juvenile
adjudications, Graham v. Florida establishes that the jurisdictions’ actual
sentencing practices are crucial.197 Thus, the real question is how juvenile
adjudications actually affect adult sentencing in practice. On this point,
appellate courts in nineteen jurisdictions have allowed juvenile
adjudications to have an outright recidivist impact, meaning the specific
number of years added to the sentence because of juvenile adjudications
can be calculated.198 These jurisdictions principally reasoned that true firsttime adult offenders need to be separated from adult defendants with
juvenile criminal records.199 Of these nineteen jurisdictions, only three
explicitly permit juvenile adjudications to count as strikes for purposes of

195. See Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Striking Out on the First Pitch in Criminal Court, 1
BARRY L. REV. 7, 18–20 tbl.2 (2000) (listing forty-five jurisdictions with explicit juvenile
court laws to this effect).
196. See id. (listing thirty-five jurisdictions that have criminal court provisions allowing
for the use of juvenile adjudications at sentencing in criminal court).
197. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023–27 (2010) (exploring actual
sentencing practices in jurisdictions that had legislation allowing the sentence at issue);
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 544 U.S. 407, 433 (2008) (same).
198. See United States v. Torres, 217 F. App’x 540, 543 (7th Cir. 2007) (allowing
juvenile adjudications to be considered to some extent for purposes of determining
recidivism); Andrews v. State, 967 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998) (same); People
v. Davis, 938 P.2d 938, 940–42 (Cal. 1997) (same); People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263, 1271
(Colo. 1984) (en banc) (same); Williams v. State, 994 So. 2d 337, 339–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2008) (same); People v. Forrest, 595 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (same);
Sauerheber v. State, 698 N.E.2d 796, 806 (Ind. 1998) (same); State v. Haskins, 942 P.2d 16,
19 (Kan. 1997) (same); State v. Tucker, 354 So. 2d 521, 524–25 (La. 1978) (same); People
v. Smith, 470 N.W.2d 70, 74–75 (Mich. 1991) (same); State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607,
614–15 (Minn. 2006) (same); State v. Bieniek, 985 A.2d 1251, 1256 (N.J. 2010) (per
curiam) (same); State v. Wiley, 565 S.E.2d 22, 44–46 (N.C. 2002) (same); State v. Stewart,
892 P.2d 1013, 1016–17 (Or. 1995) (same); Commonwealth v. Myers, 536 A.2d 428, 429–
30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (same); State v. Jackson, 60 S.W.3d 738, 741–43 (Tenn. 2001)
(same); Lindsay v. State, 102 S.W.3d 223, 226–27 (Tex. App. 2003) (same); Harris v.
Commonwealth, 497 S.E.2d 165, 171–72 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (same); State v. McAlpin,
740 P.2d 824, 826–27 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (same).
199. See, e.g., Smith, 470 N.W.2d at 75 (stating that “[t]he law contemplates a
differentiation in sentencing between first-time offenders and recidivists, juvenile or adult”);
State v. Peterson, 331 N.W.2d 483, 484 (Minn. 1983) (en banc) (“The juvenile history item
is included in the criminal history index to identify those young adult felons whose criminal
careers were preceded by repeated felony-type offenses committed as a juvenile.” (citation
omitted)); Commonwealth v. Krum, 533 A.2d 134, 139 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (concluding
that “a child who continues his pattern of serious and violent anti-social activity into
adulthood should not receive the benefit of a cloak of immunity regarding that behavior”
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

WALSH.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

OUT OF THE STRIKE ZONE

10/18/2011 12:20 PM

189

their three strikes laws.200 At the other end of the spectrum, two states
categorically forbid judges from using juvenile adjudications to enhance an
adult sentence.201
In the majority of jurisdictions, on the other hand, “it is impossible to
determine the precise impact juvenile records can or will have on criminal
court sentencing.”202 A history in the juvenile justice system can matter in
these jurisdictions, but juvenile adjudications seem to be one flexible factor
among many others when sentencing the defendant, thus promoting the
idea of sentencing on an individualized basis.203 In the end, the mixed-bag
of jurisdictions’ policies and practices on using juvenile-age convictions for
recidivism purposes demonstrates the lack of a national consensus
regarding this particular sentencing regime.
B. Life Without Parole Under § 841(b)(1)(A) is Too Severe for These
Offenders Because of Their Diminished Culpability and Because this
Sentence Lacks a Sufficient Penological Justification
Although the United States lacks a national consensus on how to treat
juvenile-age convictions when sentencing adult offenders, the second step
of Graham v. Florida’s analysis shows this sentencing practice is cruel and
unusual. At the second step in Graham v. Florida, the Court exercised its
“independent judgment” to conclude life without parole was
disproportionate for juvenile defendants convicted of nonhomicide crimes
and would not serve any legitimate penological goal.204 Likewise, under
the Graham v. Florida framework, sentencing defendants like Angelo Scott
and Donald Graham to § 841(b)(1)(A) life without parole is
unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.

200. See Davis, 938 P.2d at 940–42 (California Supreme Court allowing juvenile
adjudications to count as strikes under the state’s three strikes law); Williams, 994 So. 2d at
339–40 (Florida District Court of Appeals permitting juvenile adjudication to be a strike);
Lindsay, 102 S.W.3d at 226–27 (Texas Court of Appeals letting juvenile adjudication count
as a strike). But see Vanesch v. State, 37 S.W.3d 196, 200–01 (Ark. 2001) (disallowing
juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses for state’s three strikes law); Fletcher v. State,
409 A.2d 1254, 1256 (Del. 1979) (same); Paige v. Gaffney, 483 P.2d 494, 495 (Kan. 1971)
(same); State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1288–90 (La. 2004) (same); Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 743 A.2d 460, 461 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (same); State v. Ellis, 547 S.E.2d 490,
492 (S.C. 2001) (same); State v. Maxey, 663 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (same).
201. See Sanborn, supra note 195, at 21 (noting how Arizona and Georgia “clearly
prevent juvenile adjudications from enhancing criminal court sentences”).
202. See id. (contending that, in twenty-six jurisdictions, “the exact difference juvenile
records will have in this context is immeasurable”).
203. Id. (explaining that a defendant’s sentence can be influenced by prior offenses, “but
no definitive impact [of prior offenses] has been allotted”).
204. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–30 (2010).
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Life without parole is unduly severe in light of the lessened culpability
of this class of offenders
The second step in Graham v. Florida initially compared the gravity of
the sentence with the culpability of the defendants.205 As in Graham v.
Florida, life without parole—the second-most severe punishment permitted
by the American criminal justice system206—is too harsh for defendants
like Angelo Scott and Donald Graham. Because they were nonviolent drug
traffickers with juvenile-age strikes, these defendants had diminished
culpability. This punishment is unconstitutionally excessive for them.
Life without parole is a drastic sentence. Even though the death penalty
is “unique in its severity and irrevocability,”207 the Supreme Court has
recognized that life without parole is similar to the death penalty in
important respects.208 A sentence of life without parole “alters the
offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable” because it “deprives the
convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.”209
Although a prisoner can potentially obtain relief through executive
clemency, such a remote possibility does not overcome the severity of this
sentence.210
The Nevada Supreme Court illustrated the exceptional nature of life
without parole in declaring:
All but the deadliest and most unsalvageable of prisoners have the right
to appear before the board of parole to try and show that they have
behaved well in prison confines and that their moral and spiritual
betterment merits consideration of some adjustment of their sentences.
Denial of this vital opportunity means denial of hope; it means that good
behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that
whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the
prisoner], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.211

The Ninth Circuit recently echoed these sentiments, noting that a life
without parole sentence “condemn[s] [the prisoner] to die in a living tomb,
there to linger out what may be a long life . . . without any of its alleviation
205. Id. at 2026–28.
206. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)
(acknowledging that life without parole “is itself a severe sanction”).
207. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
208. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (asserting that “life without parole
sentences share some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other
sentences”).
209. Id.
210. Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01 (1983)); accord Naovarath v.
State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 n.1 (Nev. 1989) (“We suppose that in light of this remote
possibility Dante’s fancied inscription on the gates of hell, ‘Abandon Hope All Ye Who
Enter Here,’ may not be properly fastened above [the prisoner’s] cell; nevertheless, for now,
the sentence is unequivocal: life imprisonment, without parole—life ends in prison.”).
211. Naovarath, 779 P.2d at 944 (emphasis added).
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or rewards—debarred from all pleasant sights and sounds, and cut off from
all earthly hope.”212 Since life without parole is so harsh, only severelyculpable criminals deserve this punishment.213
Defendants like Angelo Scott and Donald Graham are not such severelyculpable criminals. The culpability of a class of offenders is partly
determined by the offenders’ characteristics.214 One of these defendants’
chief characteristics is that they were juveniles when they committed at
least one of their predicate offenses.215 The Supreme Court has explicitly
stated that juvenile crime is not as morally-offensive as adult criminal
conduct.216 As Roper demonstrated and Graham v. Florida reaffirmed, this
lesser moral blameworthiness is based on scientific conclusions that the
juvenile brain is still developing.217 In light of these physiological
circumstances, the Supreme Court has understood that “youth is more than
a chronological fact”—it is a distinct “time and condition of life.”218
Juveniles are often immature, irresponsible, more vulnerable to negative
pressures in their environment, and, frequently, they do not fully consider
the consequences of their actions.219 The Eighth and Sixth Circuits
recognized that Angelo Scott and Donald Graham were adults when they
were sentenced to § 841(b)(1)(A) life without parole,220 yet their prior
convictions that triggered these mandatory sentences were committed while
they were juveniles and thus were the product of these characteristics.221
Further, the Eighth and Sixth Circuits were wrong to rely on the fact that
Angelo Scott and Donald Graham were charged, tried, and convicted as

212. Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1291 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
213. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–28 (analyzing the severity of life
without parole and concluding juvenile nonhomicide offenders are not culpable enough to
deserve this sentence).
214. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining that culpability is measured
by (1) the offenders’ characteristics and (2) the crimes they committed).
215. See supra notes 156–157, 170 and accompanying text (detailing the defendants’
earlier strikes for purposes of § 841(b)).
216. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569
(2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion).
217. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27 (citing various amici and other
scientific authorities); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–76 (same).
218. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
219. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70; accord Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)
(plurality opinion) (observing that juveniles “often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them”).
220. See supra notes 165, 176 and accompanying text (providing the circuit courts’
reasoning).
221. Cf. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402–06 (2011) (detailing why
“children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults” and thus holding that a child’s age
properly informs the custody analysis under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966));
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27 (covering those characteristics of juveniles that
make them a unique class of defendants); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–71 (noting juveniles’
distinctive features).
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adults for their predicate offenses.222 Indeed, the juvenile defendants in
both Roper and Graham v. Florida had also been charged, tried, and
convicted as adults.223 In both cases, however, the Supreme Court
invalidated those sentences and fashioned categorical rules for defendants
under eighteen-years-old because of the inherent differences between
adults and juveniles.224 Regardless of whether they were prosecuted as
adults, defendants who were juveniles at the time of their predicate
offenses are less culpable than defendants whose three strikes were entirely
the product of their adult criminal conduct.
A defendant’s culpability also depends on the nature of the crime he
Angelo Scott and Donald Graham had diminished
committed.225
culpability because they committed nonviolent offenses.226 In a seminal
Eighth Amendment case, the Supreme Court asserted that nonviolent
crimes are less serious than violent or threatening crimes.227 Defendants
falling within the purview of § 841(b)(1)(A) deserve significant
punishment. But nonviolent drug traffickers should not be classified
among the second-worst offenders in the American criminal justice
system.228 The defendant in Kennedy heinously raped his eight-year-old
stepdaughter, yet the Supreme Court held the maximum sentence he could
222. See supra notes 161, 174 and accompanying text (referring to the circuit courts’
emphasis on Angelo Scott and Donald Graham having been prosecuted in the adult criminal
system for their prior convictions).
223. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2018 (“Graham’s prosecutor elected to charge
Graham as an adult.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 557 (“[Simmons] was tried as an adult.”).
224. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–71.
225. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that culpability is determined by
both (1) the offender’s characteristics and (2) the type of crime he committed).
226. See J. Richard Broughton, Kennedy and the Tail of Minos, 69 LA. L. REV. 593, 625
(2009) (“Indeed, there is a compelling argument to be made that where the crimes involved
are nonviolent and result in minimal harm, courts ought to be more robust in reviewing
facially harsh sentences and in enforcing limits on political actors.”); see also Paul Butler,
Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE
L.J. 677, 680 (1995) (urging juries to acquit nonviolent drug offenders, especially black
offenders in urban locations); Ed Burns et al., Saving Cities, and Souls, TIME, Mar. 17,
2008, at 50 (supporting petit grand jury nullification when prosecutors try to charge
nonviolent drug offenders).
227. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292–93 (1983) (noting that criminal laws are more
protective of people than property); accord BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–76 (1996)
(recognizing “the accepted view that some wrongs are more blameworthy than others,” such
as violent versus nonviolent crimes). The idea that crimes of violence should be punished
more severely than nonviolent crimes is expressed throughout American criminal law
doctrines, such as the limitations that legislatures and courts place on the felony-murder
rule. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2010) (enumerating specific violent felonies,
like torture, rape, arson, and kidnapping, that a defendant must commit to be subject to first
degree felony-murder); People v. Howard, 104 P.3d 107, 110–11 (Cal. 2005) (articulating
that a defendant must commit a felony “inherently dangerous to human life” to qualify for
second degree felony-murder (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Robinson et al.,
supra note 194, at 1959 n.73 (listing forty jurisdictions that only allow inherently dangerous
felonies to trigger the felony-murder rule).
228. See supra notes 206–212 and accompanying text (explaining that life without parole
is the second-harshest punishment in the United States and thus is extremely severe).
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receive was life without parole.229 Even defendants involved in the
September 11 terrorist attacks and al Qaeda’s war against the United States
have only been sentenced to life without parole.230 Nonviolent drug
traffickers are not as morally reprehensible as violent criminals who truly
deserve life without parole.231 Just as the Graham v. Florida Court
concluded that life without parole was categorically disproportionate for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders,232 Angelo Scott and Donald Graham were
not sufficiently culpable to warrant mandatory § 841(b)(1)(A) life without
parole due to their prior juvenile-age convictions. Their sentences were
unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
2.

No legitimate penological goal adequately justifies counting juvenileage convictions as strikes
The second analytical step in Graham v. Florida next required the Court
to consider potential penological justifications for the sentence.233 A
sentence is unconstitutional if it does not sufficiently further any of the four
accepted goals of punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.234 The government must show more than some marginal
promotion of a penological goal; each penological justification is limited
by the principle that the punishment must not be “grossly disproportionate
in light of the justification offered.”235 As demonstrated below, none of
these four penological theories adequately justifies § 841(b)(1)(A) life
without parole for a defendant who is on his third strike due to juvenile-age
predicate offenses.

229. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 412–15, 438 (2008).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 410 F. App’x 673, 675 (4th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (affirming a life sentence for Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, who was affiliated with an al
Qaeda cell in Saudi Arabia and planned to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States);
United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 307 (4th Cir. 2010) (upholding Zacarias
Moussaoui’s life without parole sentence after he pled guilty to conspiracy charges
connected to the September 11 attacks).
231. See United States v. Williams, 299 F.3d 250, 258–59 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that
a drug offender must not have used violence or the threat of violence in connection with his
offense to be eligible for the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) safety valve, which pardons a defendant
from the mandatory minimum); United States v. Byers, No. 3:00-CR-137-6-FDW, 2008 WL
7994962, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 5, 2008) (stating that typical, nonviolent crack cocaine
offenders are less culpable than the defendant, who had “participated in an extremely violent
drug conspiracy and was himself an accessory to felony murder”); United States v. Cherry,
366 F. Supp. 2d 372, 376 (E.D. Va. 2005) (recognizing that the defendant qualified for the §
3553(f) safety valve, in part, because she “did not use any violence, threats of violence, a
firearm, or any other dangerous weapon, nor did she encourage anyone else to do so”).
232. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030–33 (2010).
233. Id. at 2028.
234. See id. (declaring that a “sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is
by its nature disproportionate to the offense”).
235. Id. at 2029.
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Retribution

The goal of retribution, whether adopting a harm-based retributivist or an
intent-based retributivist approach, does not support the use of juvenile-age
convictions to reach life without parole under § 841(b)(1)(A). The
Supreme Court does not normally endorse harm-based retributivism,236 yet
harm-based retributivists argue that drug traffickers deserve harsh
punishment because of the potential far-reaching consequences of their
illegal activities.237 But drug trafficking is neither a crime against the
person nor, by definition, a violent offense.238 The only criterion for a
defendant to fall within the purview of § 841(b)(1)(A) is the quantity of
drugs he trafficked.239 Although drug quantity can potentially relate to the
amount of harm a drug trafficker causes, only the specific facts of a case
can accurately demonstrate the defendant’s culpability.240
Nor does intent-based retributivism, based exclusively on the personal

236. See supra notes 118, 120–122 and accompanying text (defining harm-based
retributivism and the rarity of the Supreme Court adopting this theory).
237. See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., SPEAKING OUT AGAINST DRUG LEGALIZATION
50–53 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/demand/speakout/speak_out_
101210.pdf (asserting that “[d]rug use, crime, and violence go hand-in-hand”); see also
Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1178–79
(2004) (noting that modern prosecutors regularly “justify their aggressive prosecutions of
narcotics traffickers on the ground that drug traffickers are likely to engage in violence” and
that prosecutors think “drug dealing has a complementary relationship to violence, and even
if drug dealing is not a terrible evil, punishing that dealing can avert greater harm to society”
(citation omitted)).
238. See United States v. Phinazee, 515 F.3d 511, 522 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that many drug trafficking crimes are “victimless” and thus do not
warrant a severe prison sentence); United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir.
1997) (distinguishing between the crime of distributing child pornography, where a victim is
directly harmed, and the crimes of “drug and immigration offenses,” which do not have a
concrete victim); Llach v. United States, 739 F.2d 1322, 1333 (8th Cir. 1984) (referring to
the drug trafficking charge against the defendant as a “victimless crime”); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2 cmt. 2 (2010) (giving the examples of “drug [and]
immigration offenses” as “offenses in which there are no identifiable victims”). But see
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (arguing that trying to label the massive quantity of drug trafficking
in this case a “victimless” crime was “false to the point of absurdity”).
239. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006) (failing to provide any factor other than
quantities of drugs as placing a defendant within this subsection).
240. See, e.g., United States v. Nagel, 559 F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 2009) (stressing that
“particular drug offenders present varying degrees of risk to the community depending upon
the circumstances”); United States v. Moore, 212 F.3d 441, 447 (8th Cir. 2000) (“Merely
purchasing drugs from someone for resale does not demonstrate that the sale of all drugs
remaining in the seller’s possession is an activity undertaken between the seller and the
buyer.”); United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1993) (reversing the district
court’s sentence because the government had not proven whether the defendant could have
reasonably foreseen his codefendant’s larger drug trafficking operations); United States v.
Jones, 965 F.2d 1507, 1517 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that one of the small-scale defendants
in a drug ring could not be sentenced to the mandatory minimum for conspiracy to distribute
at least fifty grams of crack cocaine because his co-conspirator’s massive sales were not
reasonably foreseeable).
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culpability of the offender,241 justify this sentencing practice.242 As
explained above, defendants like Angelo Scott and Donald Graham have
diminished culpability for two reasons. First, they were juveniles at the
time of at least one of their underlying offenses.243 Second, they were
convicted of nonviolent drug trafficking charges, so they should not be
classified among the second-worst class of criminal defendants.244 Thus,
mandatory § 841(b)(1)(A) life without parole for these offenders is not
warranted under either a harm-based or intent-based retributivist theory.
b.

General deterrence

The penological goal of general deterrence does not legitimize using
juvenile-age convictions as strikes to reach a § 841(b)(1)(A) life-withoutparole sentence. Three strikes laws and other recidivism-based sentencing
schemes may further general deterrence to some extent.245 Still, life
without parole is unconstitutional here because of this rationale’s limits as
applied to defendants like Angelo Scott and Donald Graham.
Many studies conclude a justice system that increases the severity of
penalties is less effective than a justice system that increases the chances of
detection and conviction.246 As economist Steven E. Landsburg explains,
“[f]or the most part, criminals prefer a small chance of a big punishment to
a big chance of a small punishment.”247 This preference stems from the
fact that criminals are typically risk-loving people.248 Most scholarship,
therefore, “point[s] to large deterrent effects emanating from increased
certainty of punishment, and much smaller, and generally insignificant,

241. See supra notes 119–122 and accompanying text (explaining intent-based
retributivism).
242. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 395, 427 (1997) (asserting that all “[h]abitual offender statutes are not
retributive” because the term of imprisonment is “imposed without regard to the culpability
of the offender”).
243. See supra notes 216–223 and accompanying text (arguing that defendants like
Angelo Scott and Donald Graham have diminished culpability based on their juvenile-age
convictions because juvenile crime is not as morally reprehensible as similar adult crime).
244. See supra notes 226–231 and accompanying text (claiming nonviolent drug
traffickers have lesser culpability than violent criminals).
245. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, pt. 1, at 10 (1970) (characterizing § 841(b)’s
sentencing scheme as a “deterrent to those who otherwise might wish to engage in the illicit
traffic”).
246. E.g., JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., RAND DRUG POLICY RESEARCH CTR.,
MANDATORY MINIMUM DRUG SENTENCES: THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYERS’
MONEY? 75 (1997); Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON.
INQUIRY 297, 297, 308 (1991).
247. Steven E. Landsburg, Does Crime Pay?, SLATE (Dec. 9, 1999, 3:30 AM),
http://www.slate.com/id/57573.
248. See id. (contrasting people who prefer a big chance of a small punishment, such as
those who go into “punishing careers” like construction work or coal mining, with
criminals, who prefer a small chance of big punishment).
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effects stemming from increased severity of sanction.”249 As a theory,
general deterrence only justifies punishment to a certain degree.250 Thus, a
system that imposes drastic penalties for recidivism should be viewed as
inherently less credible than a system that more frequently detects and
punishes criminal conduct.
Because the current criminal justice system focuses on harsh
punishments instead of increased detection and conviction, particularly for
drug offenses, significant questions remain about the rationale of general
deterrence as applied to drug traffickers.251 Drug traffickers “probably do
calculate the risks and rewards [of their crimes] in a fairly sophisticated
way.”252 And the American law enforcement system does not detect and
convict drug traffickers to nearly the same extent as other types of
criminals.253 Therefore, the cost-benefit analysis favors criminals who
traffic drugs.254 Consequently, as Professor Leipold concluded, “if
deterrence of drug use through the criminal law is our goal, we appear to be
tinkering at the margins” instead of attacking the heart of the problem by
increasing detection and conviction rates.255
Moreover, the rationale of general deterrence can never fully apply to
juvenile criminal conduct. As the Roper Court observed, “the same
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as
well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”256 Simply put,
juveniles often fail to recognize many consequences of their actions.257 As
a result, a defendant with juvenile-age strikes should not be subject to the
same level of punishment as a defendant whose entire criminal career was
249. Grogger, supra note 246, at 308; accord Landsburg, supra note 247 (claiming “if
you want to make crime less attractive to criminals, it’s better to double the odds of
conviction than to double the severity of the punishment”).
250. See Herbert L. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV.
1071, 1076 (1964) (suggesting that it would be inappropriate to rely on general deterrence
too heavily because “boiling people in oil [for] a slow and painful death may be thought
more of a deterrent to crime than a quick and painless one”).
251. See generally Andrew D. Leipold, The War on Drugs and the Puzzle of Deterrence,
6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 111, 112–22 (2002) (exploring why deterrence has failed in the
war on drugs).
252. Id. at 115.
253. See id. at 120–21 (examining “clearance rate” statistics, which show “the
percentage of crimes committed that result in an arrest and the filing of criminal charges,”
for various crimes).
254. See id. at 115 (observing “that there seems to be no end to the rational (if immoral)
[drug traffickers] who are willing to give it a try” (citation omitted)).
255. Id. at 121 (“More pointedly, if we want to get a deterrence effect in [drug] crimes
comparable to other offenses, we have to escalate the drug war considerably.”).
256. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
257. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028–29 (2010) (analyzing why deterrence
did not serve as an adequate theory to support the sentencing practice at issue); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“The likelihood that the teenage
offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the
possibility of [severe punishment] is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.”).

WALSH.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

OUT OF THE STRIKE ZONE

10/18/2011 12:20 PM

197

the product of his adult decisions because general deterrence affects each of
these individuals differently. For these reasons, the penological theory of
general deterrence does not adequately justify § 841(b)(1)(A) life without
parole due to juvenile-age strikes.
c.

Specific deterrence and incapacitation

Although specific deterrence and incapacitation are often the main
rationales cited by proponents of recidivist sentencing schemes,258 these
theories do not validate § 841(b)(1)(A) life without parole for defendants
with juvenile-age strikes. These two concepts are best analyzed together
because both are based on the justice system’s ability to accurately predict
who is likely to engage in future criminal activity.
Before evaluating the faults of specific deterrence and incapacitation as
applied to defendants like Angelo Scott and Donald Graham, it is worth
noting that imprisonment—for any length of time—is an imperfect means
of implementing these penological goals. Crime does not stop at the
jailhouse doors.259 Gangs are present and growing throughout the
American penal system,260 and prisons are the sites of a great deal of illegal
activity.261 Thus, incarcerating criminals does not completely stop them
from committing more crimes; imprisonment only prevents some crimes
from happening outside of jail.
Even if the goal is to deter and incapacitate ex-convicts so they do not
commit crimes within the general population, these penological theories are
of limited use for defendants like Angelo Scott and Donald Graham. To
sufficiently justify life without parole with these two rationales, the
criminal justice system would have to accurately predict who will pose a
258. In Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), the Court observed, “a recidivist
statute[’s] . . . primary goals are to deter repeat offenders and, at some point in the life of
one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses serious enough to be punished as felonies, to
segregate that person from the rest of society for an extended period of time.” Id. at 27
(plurality opinion) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992) (arguing that
“[s]tates have a valid interest in deterring and segregating habitual criminals”); Robinson et
al., supra note 194, at 1950 (reiterating that “[t]he underlying rationale for [habitual
offender] statutes is typically incapacitative” (citation omitted)).
259. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 301–05 (1995) (providing the underlying
facts of the case, which were that a black inmate had been stabbed to death in the Missouri
State Penitentiary); Ryan, supra note 120, at 110 n.154 (citing statistics about the number of
homicides that occurred in state prisons from 2001–2006).
260. See generally Geoffrey Hunt et al., Changes in Prison Culture: Prison Gangs &
the Case of the “Pepsi Generation,” 40 SOC. PROBS. 398, 398–409 (1993) (studying
California prison gangs and noting that “although all five of the older gangs still exist . . . a
new crop of gangs has taken center stage”).
261. See, e.g., VICTOR HASSINE, LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: LIVING AND DYING IN PRISON
TODAY 33–39 (Robert Johnson & Sonia Tabriz eds., 5th ed. 2011) (describing the realities
of life in jail, including prison subcultures and the regularity of in-prison violence); id. at
80–84 (providing details about different types of prison rape).
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continuing threat to society.262 As the Graham v. Florida Court declared,
“[t]o justify life without parole on the assumption that the [defendant]
forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a
judgment that the [defendant] is incorrigible.”263 As one state court aptly
stated, however, “incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”264 Since a
juvenile’s character is more malleable than that of an adult and his
“personality traits . . . are more transitory [and] less fixed [than those of an
adult],”265 juvenile criminal conduct is not necessarily indicative of how an
offender will behave in the future. Likewise, defendants with prior
juvenile-age convictions who are subject to the sentencing scheme of §
841(b)(1)(A) cannot be definitively categorized as posing a perpetual
danger to society.266
In addition, these two penological goals do not wholly apply to
defendants like Angelo Scott and Donald Graham because of the nature of
their crimes. According to government-conducted studies, nonviolent drug
traffickers have one of the lowest recidivism rates of any class of
offenders.267 Although a defendant on his third strike can already be
thought of as a recidivist to some extent, only the particular facts of his
case can reveal whether he is a true drug trafficking recidivist or if his
strikes were the result of other, less severe drug offenses that fit within §
841(b)(1)(A)’s expansive definition of “felony drug offense.”268 With such
uncertainty in accurately predicting these defendants’ potential for future
262. See supra notes 129–135 and accompanying text (examining the implications of
specific deterrence and incapacitation as penological theories).
263. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010).
264. Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968); accord Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) (insisting that “[i]t is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption”).
265. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (citing ERIK ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS
(1968)). The Roper Court elaborated from this point, stating that “[f]rom a moral standpoint
it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater
possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.” Id.
266. Cf. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (commanding that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause “forbid[s] States from making the judgment at the outset that [juvenile
nonhomicide] offenders never will be fit to reenter society”).
267. See United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting) (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL
HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 13 (2004) (observing that
drug trafficking offenders are within the group of offenders that “are overall the least likely
to recidivate”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, OFFENDERS
RETURNING TO FEDERAL PRISON, 1986-97, at 1, 3 (2000) (observing that drug offenders had
a lower recidivism rate than property and public-order offenders)).
268. Compare United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2010) (revealing that
the defendant’s first two strikes were only convictions for drug possession charges), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 964 (2011), with United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir.
2010) (showing how the defendant’s first two strikes were related to previous instances of
drug trafficking), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2962 (2011).
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crime, specific deterrence and incapacitation fail to sufficiently justify §
841(b)(1)(A) life without parole.
d.

Rehabilitation

The penological goal of rehabilitation cannot justify life without parole
under § 841(b)(1)(A) due to juvenile-age strikes. Through rehabilitation,
the state seeks to reform and improve a criminal’s character so he can
become a productive member of society.269 In Graham v. Florida, the
Court stated why the theory of rehabilitation can never justify life without
parole:
“The penalty forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal
[because] . . . the [government] makes an irrevocable judgment about that
person’s value and place in society.”270 Further, beyond “expressive
judgment” about the individual’s worth, a life without parole sentence
carries practical consequences for the convict when in prison.271 For
example, states often refuse access to educational and vocational training
programs for inmates sentenced to life without parole.272 For these reasons,
life without parole is inherently contrary to the goal of rehabilitation.
C. International Standards Relating to Juvenile Criminal Conduct and
Drug Trafficking Offenses Confirm this Sentencing Practice Is Cruel and
Unusual
Just as international sources supported Graham v. Florida’s holding,273
international norms also show that using juvenile-age convictions as strikes
under § 841(b)(1)(A) is cruel and unusual. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly looked beyond the United States’ borders in Eighth Amendment
cases.274 While international standards are not controlling,275 the Court has
269. See supra notes 142–146 and accompanying text (defining rehabilitation).
270. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2029–30; accord Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 1028 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reasoning that since “a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole . . . [means] [t]he offender will never
regain his freedom,” the punishment “does not even purport to serve a rehabilitative
function”).
271. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
272. See id. (citing Brief of the Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 11–13, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412) & Sullivan v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (per curiam) (No. 08-7621)).
273. See id. at 2033 (emphasizing that the Court’s conclusion was supported by the fact
that “the world over” rejected sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life without
parole).
274. See id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 316–17 n.21 (2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988)
(plurality opinion); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796–97 & n.22 (1982) (plurality
opinion); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (plurality opinion); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958) (plurality opinion)). But see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 739–51 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(criticizing the practice of using foreign legal sources when interpreting the United States
Constitution).

WALSH.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

200

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/18/2011 12:20 PM

[Vol. 61:165

recognized “‘the climate of international opinion concerning the
acceptability of a particular punishment’ is an additional consideration
which is ‘not irrelevant.’”276 Thus, this portion of the analysis does not
turn on the mandatory or permissive nature of the United States’
international obligations; international standards merely inform Eighth
Amendment values.
Even though most American defendants, like Angelo Scott and Donald
Graham, are adults when they are subject to mandatory § 841(b)(1)(A) life
without parole, well-recognized principles of international human rights
law should generate concern about the ramifications of using juvenile-age
convictions to reach that sentence.277 The international community is often
more sensitive to the consequences of juvenile crime, demonstrated by the
United States standing as the world’s only nation with a functioning
government that is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child.278 Article 37(a) of this Convention provides, in part,
“life imprisonment without possibility of release shall [not] be imposed for
offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”279 Further,
Article 40(1) of this Convention directly advances a rehabilitative theory
by stressing that juveniles should “be treated in a manner consistent
with . . . promoting the child’s reintegration and the child’s assuming a
constructive role in society.”280 As Amnesty International has noted,
“[m]ost [foreign] governments either have expressly prohibited, never
allowed, or do not impose [life without parole] sentences on child
offenders, because it violates the principles of child development and

275. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. at 2033 (“The judgments of other nations and the
international community are not dispositive as to the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.”).
276. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796 n.22 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10).
277. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, G.A. Res.
40/33, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1985).
278. See Brief for Amnesty International et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 15, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412) & Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2059 (2010) (per curiam) (No. 08-7621) [hereinafter Amnesty International Brief] (detailing
how the United States and Somalia, which does not have a functioning government, are the
only two countries that have not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child).
279. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
280. Id. art. 40(1); accord United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice, G.A. Res. 40/33, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33, at 212 (Nov. 29, 1985) (“The objective of training and treatment of
juveniles placed in institutions is to provide care, protection, education and vocations skills,
with a view to assisting them to assume socially constructive and productive roles in
society.”). Various other international sources also highlight the primacy that rehabilitation
should have whenever any criminal, juvenile or adult, is imprisoned. See DIRK VAN ZYL
SMIT, TAKING LIFE IMPRISONMENT SERIOUSLY IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 13
(2002) (discussing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American
Convention on Human Rights, the Constitution of Spain, and the Constitution of Italy as all
stressing the importance of rehabilitation).
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protection established through . . . international human rights law.”281 In
Germany, for instance, juvenile defendants cannot receive a prison
sentence over ten years for any crime they commit.282 Thus, using
juvenile-age convictions as strikes under § 841(b)(1)(A) defies the normal
international practice of limiting the consequences of juvenile crime.
Further, many countries do not punish drug offenses as harshly as the
United States does, supporting the idea that mandatory § 841(b)(1)(A) life
without parole due to juvenile-age strikes is cruel and unusual. In one
Canadian case, for example, the defendant was convicted of importing
seven and a half ounces of cocaine, subjecting him to a mandatory
minimum of seven years imprisonment.283 Interpreting section 12 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which also prohibits “cruel and
unusual” punishments,284 the Supreme Court of Canada held the statute was
unlawful.285 In reaching this conclusion, the court evaluated the mandatory
punishment as it would have applied to the least culpable offender.286
Significantly, the court overlooked the defendant’s known history of drug
smuggling and the nature of the imported drug, showing a level of leniency
atypical in American drug trafficking cases.287 This case demonstrates
Canada’s commitment to ensuring that only the worst criminal offenders
receive the worst criminal sentences.288
Angelo Scott and Donald Graham are not among the worst American
criminals, and no penological goal adequately justifies life without parole
for them.289 Declaring their sentences unconstitutional would be consistent
with international norms.
281. Amnesty International Brief, supra note 278, at 17 (citing Connie de la Vega &
Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 989–
90 (2008)).
282. Id. at 16.
283. See R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, paras. 36–38 (Can.) (laying out the facts of
the case and the statutory provision at issue). While the mandatory minimum was only
seven years, the defendant, in fact, had received an eight-year sentence. Id. paras. 14, 18.
284. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 12, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) (“Everyone has the right not
to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”).
285. See Smith, 1 S.C.R. para. 107.
286. As Justice Lamer stated,
[A] judge who would sentence to seven years in a penitentiary a young person who,
while driving back into Canada from a winter break in the U.S.A., is caught with
only one, indeed, let’s postulate, his or her first “joint of grass,” would certainly be
considered by most Canadians to be a cruel and, all would hope, a very unusual
judge.
Id. para. 34.
287. See id. paras. 65–69 (evaluating the law at issue in the abstract rather than as
applied to the particular defendant).
288. See id. para. 73 (stating that “[w]e do not need to sentence the small offenders to
seven years in prison in order to deter the serious offender,” and thus concluding that “the
net cast by [the statute at issue] for sentencing purposes need not be so wide”).
289. See supra Part II.B (arguing that life without parole is unconstitutional, as it is too
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III. SECTION 3553(a) IS THE PROPER PLACE FOR JUDGES TO CONSIDER A
DEFENDANT’S JUVENILE CRIMINAL HISTORY
Although using juvenile-age convictions as strikes under § 841(b)(1)(A)
to reach life without parole is unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida, a
defendant’s juvenile criminal history need not be completely excluded at
sentencing. Regardless of any other sentencing provision related to a
particular crime, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 overlays the imposition of all criminal
sentences.290 Under § 3553, all federal district court judges must first
calculate the proper Sentencing Guidelines range.291 From that point, the
judge must consider an appropriate sentence for the defendant in view of
the factors outlined in § 3553(a).292 Section 3553(a)(1) specifically directs
the sentencing judge to consider “the history and characteristics of the
defendant.”293 If a defendant has exhibited an elevated pattern of criminal
conduct and the prosecution has adequately demonstrated that the
defendant deserves more than the mandatory minimum, the judge can
sentence him to a longer term.294
In recent years, the Supreme Court has strived to advance the notion of
sentencing defendants on an individual basis.295 The landmark 2005
decision United States v. Booker,296 which held the mandatory nature of the
federal Sentencing Guidelines was unconstitutional,297 dramatically
illustrates the Court’s willingness to ensure defendants are sentenced as
individuals. As the Court has recognized, “[i]t has been uniform and
constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider
every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in
the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime
severe for these defendants because of their diminished culpability and because it does not
sufficiently further any legitimate penological goal).
290. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
291. Nelson v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 890, 891–92 (2009) (per curiam).
292. Id.
293. § 3553(a)(1); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f) (providing the means for a defendant’s
counsel to object to a presentence report based on that defendant’s individual traits).
294. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (acknowledging a district court
judge’s broad discretion in sentencing); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)
(asserting that “the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime”); see also
Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 564 (1984) (advancing the view that considering a
broad range of evidence about the defendant “ensures that the punishment will suit not
merely the offense but the individual defendant”).
295. See, e.g., Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1239–50 (2011) (emphasizing
the broad range of evidence about the individual that trial courts may consider when
imposing a sentence); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding resulting
in the federal Sentencing Guidelines becoming advisory, rather than mandatory); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004) (holding the state’s implementation of a determinate
sentencing scheme unconstitutional, effectively making the state guidelines advisory instead
of mandatory).
296. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
297. Id. at 245.
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and the punishment to ensue.”298
Federal district court judges are constantly sentencing individual
defendants; these judges are appropriately situated and experienced in this
area. Not only do federal district court judges have an “institutional
advantage” over federal appellate judges,299 district court judges occupy a
uniquely different position from legislators. Most district court judges
sentence over 100 defendants every year.300 Rather than creating policy of
general applicability, a “judge sees and hears the evidence, makes
credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains
insights” in every case he decides.301
Since the sentencing judge is the most familiar with the defendant,302 he
should receive discretion. By allowing sentencing judges to address
juvenile-age convictions as one consideration under § 3553(a), rather than
as rigid predicate offenses that trigger heightened penalties under §
841(b)(1)(A), the criminal justice system will stay true to the ideal of
individualized sentencing.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Graham v. Florida demands that the
American criminal justice system critically reexamine a number of its
underlying doctrines and sentencing practices. Based on Graham v.
Florida, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause forbids using juvenileage convictions as strikes to trigger mandatory § 841(b)(1)(A) life without
parole. In view of jurisdictions’ legislation and actual sentencing practices,
the United States lacks a clear national consensus on how to view this type
of sentencing practice. Yet drug traffickers who have juvenile-age strikes
are not culpable enough to deserve the extreme punishment of life without
parole. Also, this sentence does not definitively serve any legitimate
penological goal for this class of offenders. Further, the manner in which
the international community views juvenile criminal conduct and drug
offenses confirms that life without parole is cruel and unusual in this
instance.
As a result, under § 841(b)(1)(A), Angelo Scott should have been subject
to a ten-year mandatory minimum, and Donald Graham should have been
298. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996); accord Pennsylvania ex rel.
Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937) (“For the determination of sentences, justice
generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was
committed and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together
with the character and propensities of the offender.”).
299. Koon, 518 U.S. at 98.
300. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52 n.7 (2007) (examining the average
number of defendants the district court judge had sentenced in a given year).
301. Id. at 51 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
302. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007).
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subject to a twenty-year mandatory minimum. Each defendant could have
received a sentence longer than the mandatory minimum, though, because
sentencing judges can—and should—consider juvenile-age convictions
under § 3553(a). Section 3553(a) ensures that all criminal defendants are
evaluated on an individual basis. As such, the Eighth Amendment
commands that Angelo Scott and Donald Graham receive individualized
treatment. They should not spend the rest of their lives in jail due to the
rigidity of § 841(b)(1)(A)’s three-strike sentencing scheme.

